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THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO THE
WARRANT REQUIREMENT: SPEEDING
AWAY FROM THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Any inquiry into the maze of search and seizure law must
begin with the following basic premise enunciated by Justice
Stewart in Katz v. United States:1 "[S]earches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-de-
lineated exceptions."'2 Among the "specifically established"
exceptions to the fourth amendment3 is the so-called "automobile
exception," which generally provides for lawful warrantless vehic-
ular searches where a two-part test can be met: (1) the officer
must have probable cause to search the vehicle 4 and (2) there
must be a showing of either exigent circumstances 5 or a lesser ex-
' 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Id. at 357.
' The fourth amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Automobiles are protected under the fourth amendment as "effects." See, United
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
The generally recognized exceptions to the fourth amendment's warrant re-
quirement are:
(1) A search incident to a lawful arrest. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969).
(2) Hot pursuit. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
(3) Stop and Frisk. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
(4) Plain view. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
(5) Consent searches. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218.
(1973).
(6) Automobile searches. See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925).
This Note deals only with the automobile exception.
4 Generally, probable cause to search is present if the facts and circumstances
would persuade a reasonably prudent person that a crime has been committed and
that evidence of the crime can be found at the location to be searched. See, e.g.,
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
1 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), where a vehicle's
1
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pectation of privacy.'
The original "automobile exception," as set forth in Carroll
v. United States,7 provided an extremely narrow exception, an
exception invokable only upon a showing of probable cause to
search combined with exigent circumstances due to the vehicle's
mobility and upon a further showing of the impracticality of pro-
curing a search warrant. The modern "automobile exception" has
been broadened so extensively that probable cause is the only ac-
tive factor which remains from the Carroll test. Exigent circum-
stances receive mere lip service from most courts,8 and the im-
practicability requirement has been generally disregarded.9
Why has the exception been so extensively broadened? One
possible explanation is that the courts are using the broadened
"automobile exception" as a shield against the devastating social
effect of the exclusionary rule. 1° If a court deems a warrantless
search violative of the fourth amendment, any evidence found
during that search cannot be introduced into evidence at trial.
Thus, many individuals who are obviously guilty are acquitted
due to insufficient evidence. Justice Rehnquist, while upholding a
warrantless vehicle search, recently wrote in Rakas v. Illinois:"
mobility created an exigent circumstance which made the attainment of a search
warrant impracticable.
6 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), where the Court stated
that a vehicle has a lesser expectation of privacy than a home.
7 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
8 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (holding that exigent
circumstances justifying a warrantless vehicle search exist even after the suspected
criminals are arrested and the vehicle is in police custody).
' See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States v. Mitchell,
538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976). In Mitchell, federal drug enforcement agents
learned of a drug operation in the spring of 1973. By October of the same year, the
agents' information was so detailed that they had videotape equipment set up
around a parking lot where a major drug transfer was expected to take place. The
agents watched as the transfer occurred, and as soon as it appeared the defendant
was going to drive away, the agents arrested him and searched his vehicle. The
agents did not have a warrant, yet the court upheld the planned warrantless
search. Due to the advance detailed information the agents possessed, it is obvious
that it would have been practicable for the agents to obtain a warrant. However,
the practicability issue was ignored by the court.
20 The exclusionary rule generally provides that evidence gained during an
unreasonable search or seizure must be excluded at trial. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
[Vol. 82
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Each time the exclusionary rule is applied it exacts a substan-
tial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment
rights. Relevant and reliable evidence is kept from the trier of
fact and the search for truth at trial is deflected.
12
In response, Justice White wrote for the dissenters:
If the Court is troubled by the practical impact of the exclu-
sionary rule, it should face the issue of that rule's continued
validity squarely instead of distorting other doctrines in an at-
tempt to reach what are perceived as the correct results in spe-
cific cases.' 3
There are two problems with justifying the broadened auto-
mobile exception on the basis of the negative social effects of the
exclusionary rule: (1) If the harmful effects of the exclusionary
rule are the sole cause of the new-look automobile exception, it
would stand to reason that the Court would also broaden all the
exceptions to the fourth amendment, but, in fact the warrant re-
quirement is being strictly construed in many non-vehicle cases;
14
and (2) the Court could easily dispense with the exclusionary
rule's effect by reverting to the strict Carroll standard, which
would result in officers procuring warrants unless truly impracti-
cable, thereby eliminating the need to invoke the exclusionary
rule.15
Whatever the reason for the broad automobile exception, this
article will attempt to show why the automobile exception should
12 Id. at 137.
13 Id. at 156.
14 See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 100 S. Ct. 338 (1979), wherein the Court held
that law enforcement officers may not search patrons of a public establishment
which is being searched pursuant to a warrant; and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), where the "search incident to a lawful arrest" exception was severely
limited by the Court. It now only applies to those areas within the prisoner's im-
mediate reach rather than to the general area in which the arrest took place.
16 As it presently stands, the automobile exception appears so broad that of-
ficers seldom attempt to procure a warrant to search a vehicle, even if they have
plenty of time. As a result, evidence which could easily be obtained through the
warrant procedure is suppressed because the officer failed to adhere to the fourth
amendment requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
See also United States v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976), wherein
the court stated, "[A]gents should attempt to secure search warrants whenever
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have been maintained in its original Carroll form. Interestingly,
the Supreme Court has reiterated its support of the fourth
amendment on numerous occasions, such as in Johnson v. United
States,16 where the Court stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached mag-
istrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.17
And in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,s the Court said of the
fourth amendment: "If it is to be a true guide to constitutional
police action, rather than just a pious phrase, then '[t]he excep-
tions cannot be enthroned into the rule.' "19 As the following dis-
cussion indicates, these pronouncements appear to have little, if
any, application to vehicle searches and seizures.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: A "LABYRINTH OF JUDICIAL
UNCERTAINTY"
20
The United States Supreme Court initially encountered the
issue of whether a warrantless search of an automobile could be
lawful in the prohibition-era case of Carroll v. United States.2' In
Carroll, the defendants were driving from Detroit to Grand
Rapids when two federal prohibition agents stopped the vehicle.22
Based upon a previous incident between the parties, the agents
had probable cause to suspect the defendants of transporting ille-
gal liquor. 3 Upon conducting a warrantless search of the vehicle,
16 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
17 Id. at 13, 14.
'8 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
19 Id. at 481.
20 People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y.2d 254, 263, 344 N.Y.S.2d 900, 907, 298 N.E.2d
78, 83 (1973) (Wachtler, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist, while addressing the
issue of the warrantless search and seizure of vehicles, said, "this branch of the
law is something less than a seamless web." Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
440 (1973).
21 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
2 Due to its proximity to the Canadian border, Detroit was a known center
for illegal liquor traffic. Id. at 160.
23 Approximately six weeks before the stop of the Carroll vehicle, the agents
[Vol. 82
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the agents found 68 bottles of liquor hidden behind the uphol-
stering of the seats.2' The defendants were then arrested and sub-
sequently convicted of violating the National Prohibition Act.25
On appeal, the defendants contended that the warrantless search
and seizure of their vehicle was in violation of their fourth
amendment rights, and that, therefore, the evidence found in the
vehicle should have been excluded. 8
The United States Supreme Court disagreed, however, and
upheld the warrantless search. Writing for a seven-member ma-
jority,2 Chief Justice Taft noted the following critical distinction:
[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practi-
cally since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling
house or other structure in respect of which a proper official
warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor
boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.2 8
However, Carroll does not stand for the proposition that any mo-
bile vehicle may be stopped and searched. Chief Justice Taft
noted that the vehicle must not only be actually mobile, but the
law enforcement officer must have probable cause to conduct a
search of the vehicle.2s While the probable cause requirement has
remained intact in post-Carroll decisions, the actual mobility re-
had arranged to buy three cases of whiskey from the defendants, who were sup-
posed to deliver the whiskey the following day. However, the defendants never
completed the transaction. During the incident, the agents saw the defendants'
vehicle, thereby enabling them to identify the vehicle they stopped between De-
troit and Grand Rapids. Id. at 134-35.
24 Id. at 136.
25 Id. at 134.
26 Id. at 136-42.
27 Justice McReynolds, joined by Justice Sutherland, dissented. They be-
lieved the search could be valid only if the defendants were arrested prior to the
search. Id. at 163-75.
28 Id. at 153.
29 "[I]f the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable
cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid." Id. at 149.
19801
5
Gardner: The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Awa
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
quirement has been expanded to inherent mobility or, in some
cases, mobility has not been considered a factor at all.3s
While Chief Justice Taft's two-pronged test for determining
when a warrantless vehicle search should be upheld has received
much attention in post-Carroll cases, one crucial statement made
by the Chief Justice has been virtually ignored: "In cases where
the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be
used. . . ,,s1 Carroll does not suggest that a warrant should be
used by an officer, nor does it suggest that a warrant need be used
only when it is convenient for the officer, but rather, any time
attainment of a warrant is "reasonably practicable" the officer
must procure a warrant.
Thus, a reasonable reading of Carroll reveals a very nar-
rowly-drawn exception to the warrant requirement, 2 one in which
a warrantless search will be upheld only if (1) it is based upon
probable cause, (2) the vehicle is mobile to the extent that it "can
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought"3 and (3) it is not "reasonably practica-
ble" to obtain a warrant.3' Half a century later, this original ver-
sion of the so-called "automobile exception" to the fourth amend-
ment can hardly be recognized.3 5
Between 1925 and 1969 the automobile exception was ad-
dressed by the United States Supreme Court only three times,
and in each instance, Carroll was merely affirmed with no further
clarification or amplification.36 During this period, most warrant-
30See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (holding a warrantless
search valid where the police had sole control of the vehicle, thereby rendering it
immobile for all practical purposes). For a case where the Court discarded the
mobility factor in favor of a "lesser expectation of privacy" test, see Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 483 (1974).
SI Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
3' In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court described
Carroll as follows: "Carroll, on its face, appears to be a classic example of the
doctrine that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable in the absence of exi-
gent circumstances. Every word in the opinion indicates the Court's adherence to
the underlying rule and its care in delineating a limited exception." Id. at 479.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
34 Id. at 156.
" See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 483 (1974); and Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
" See Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher v. United Statei,
[Vol. 82
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less vehicle searches fell within the broad parameters of another
exception to the warrant requirement-the "search incident to a
lawful arrest" exception. 7 However, in 1969 the Supreme Court
narrowed the search incident to a lawful arrest exception in
Chimel v. California"s so as to make it applicable to only those
areas in the prisoner's immediate reach, thereby removing vehi-
cles from its scope. The Chimel limitation instigated a resurgence
in the importance of the automobile exception, as evidenced by
the Court's decision to further develop the Carroll holding within
a year of the Chimel decision.
In 1970, Chambers v. Maroney"9 set the automobile excep-
tion on a new and different road than that which Carroll had pre-
viously paved. The case arose from a situation where witnesses to
an armed robbery provided police with a description of the vehi-
cle used in the robbery. Shortly thereafter, a station wagon
matching the description given the police, and in which an occu-
pant was dressed in a manner similar to that described by the
witnesses was stopped.40 At this point in the scenario, assuming
probable cause, Carroll would certainly support a warrantless
search of the vehicle since it was capable of being "quickly
moved."" However, the police chose first to arrest the occupants
and then drive the vehicle to the police station,'42 where a war-
rantless search revealed evidence subsequently used against the
defendant. The search at the police station failed to meet Carroll
standards in two respects: (1) With the vehicle in the sole control
of the police, the vehicle was no longer actually mobile and there-
fore, there were no exigent circumstances on which to justify the
warrantless search; and (2) since the vehicle was no longer actu-
305 U.S. 251 (1938); and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
3 Under this exception, an officer could search the place where the arrest was
made in order to seize evidence connected with the crime. See, e.g., United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
s8 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
:9 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
40 Id. at 44.
41 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
42The Court stated: "It was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to
the station house. All occupants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in
the middle of the night. A careful search at that point was impractical and per-
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ally mobile, it was "reasonably practicable' 43 for the police to
procure a search warrant, an avenue which Carroll insists "must
be used."
44
Yet, the Supreme Court in Chambers, with Justice White
writing for the seven-member majority, upheld the warrantless
search:
On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been
searched on the spot when it was stopped since there was
probable cause to search and it was a fleeting target for a
search. The probable-cause factor still obtained at the station
house and so did the mobility of the car .... 45
The Court was clearly correct as to its holding that the probable
cause factor still is "obtained at the station house." However,
whether the vehicle's mobility still obtained is questionable at
best. Justice White explained the majority's rationale:
Arguably, ... , only the immobilization of the car should be
permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only
the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the magistrate au-
thorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which
the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question ..... For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the
one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the prob-
able cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.40
In a Carroll-supporting dissent, Justice Harlan took exception to
Justice White's "debatable question":
[T]he lesser intrusion will almost always be the simple seizure
of the car for the period-perhaps a day-necessary to enable
the officers to obtain a search warrant .... To be sure, one
can conceive of instances in which the occupant ... ,would
be more deeply offended by a temporary immobilization of his
vehicle than by a prompt search of it. However, such a person
always remains free to consent to an immediate search, thus
avoiding any delay. Where consent is not forthcoming, the oc-
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
4 Id.
I Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
46 Id. at 51, 52.
[Vol. 82
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cupants of the car have an interest in privacy that is protected
by the Fourth Amendment even where the circumstances jus-
tify a temporary seizure. . . The Court's endorsement of a
warrantless invasion of that privacy where another course
would suffice is simply inconsistent with our repeated stress on
the Fourth Amendment's mandate of "'adherence to judicial
processes.' ,"
Unfortunately, Justice Harlan's plea was for naught. Chambers
presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify Carroll,
wherein the search was conducted prior to the arrest of the occu-
pants. Chambers could have held that if the occupants are ar-
rested prior to a search, the vehicle can only be searched with a
warrant, because the police are then in control of the vehicle,
thereby eliminating any true exigency. Such a holding would not
only have been consistent with Carroll, but it also would be easy
to apply."" But the Court chose instead to broaden the automo-
bile exception to the extent that the need for mobility was there-
after questionable and the Carroll pronouncement that a warrant
must be obtained when reasonably practicable was laid to rest.
The test after Chambers was based merely on probable cause to
search, as long as some degree of mobility existed at the time the
car was seized.4
9
The uncertainty as to the degree of mobility required, and
the Court's failure in Chambers to enunciate a clear standard
upon which warrantless vehicle searches could be judged, led the
Court to an irreconcilable division in Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire.50 The defendant was under investigation for the murder of
a young girl.51 Approximately one month after the investigation
47 Id. at 63, 64.
4" As the automobile exception now stands, an officer must make legal judg-
ments as to whether a warrant is needed. If the above suggested holding had been
adopted by the Court, an officer would know he needed a warrant to search a
vehicle, except in one narrowly-defined situation, i.e., where the vehicle is (1) actu-
ally mobile, (2) the officer has probable cause to search, but (3) he does not have
sufficient probable cause to effectuate an arrest, and (4) it is impracticable to ob-
tain a warrant prior to the search.
49 The test is often expressed as condoning a warrantless vehicle search when
there is both probable cause to search and exigent circumstances justifying the
warrantless search. In regard to vehicles, inherent mobility is usually a sufficient
"exigent circumstance." See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
:0 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
1 Id. at 445.
1980]
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had begun, police officers obtained warrants, which were later in-
validated, authorizing them to arrest the defendant and to search
his automobile. 52 Following the arrest, the defendant's car was
towed from his private residence to the police station where a
search was conducted two days later.53 Evidence 54 found in the
car was used against the defendant at his trial, at which he was
convicted of murder. On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, Justice Stewart, in a plurality opinion,r5 evinced his belief
that mobility of a vehicle was still a factor when applying the au-
tomobile exception, even after Chambers:
In this case, it is, of course, true that even though Coolidge was
in jail, his wife was miles away in the company of two plain-
clothesmen, and the Coolidge property was under the guard of
two other officers, the automobile was in a literal sense "mo-
52 Both warrants were later declared invalid because they had been issued by
the state Attorney General, who acted as the chief prosecutor at the defendant's
trial, rather than by a neutral and detached magistrate. Thus, the case was treated
as one involving the warrantless search of a vehicle. Id. at 449-53.
53 Id. at 447.
" The evidence gathered from the vehicle consisted of vacuum sweepings, in-
cluding particles of gun powder, used in an attempt by the State to show by mi-
croscopic analysis that the deceased had been in the defendant's car. The trial
judge referred the motion to suppress this evidence to the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court, which held the evidence admissible. Id. at 448.
55 The Coolidge plurality opinion, with Justice Stewart writing, was broken
down into three parts. In Part I, the warrant authorizing the search of the vehicle
was declared invalid because it was not issued by a neutral and detached magis-
trate, but rather by the state Attorney General, who was involved in the investiga-
tion. Justice Stewart was joined by Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and
Harlan on this point.
Part H A of the opinion dealt with the rejection of the State's contention that
the search of the vehicle was valid as "incident to a lawful arrest."
Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined in Part II B, holding
that the warrantless search could not be validated under the automobile exception
because of the absence of exigent circumstances which would make it impractica-
ble to obtain a warrant. In Part H C, the same four Justices held that the doctrine
of "plain view" could not justify the warrantless search of the vehicle.
In Part I D, Justice Harlan joined the aforenamed four Justices in holding
that no exigent circumstances exist when police have planned the search well in
advance.
Part III of the opinion did not deal with the search of the automobile.
Justice Harlan concurred in the Court's judgment and particularly with Parts
I, H D, and m.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black, Blackmun, and White all filed sepa-
rate dissenting opinions. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
[Vol. 82
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bile." A person who had the keys and could slip by the guard
could drive it away. We attach no constitutional significance to
this sort of mobility.8
Not only did Justice Stewart reaffirm the Carroll mobility re-
quirement, he also stressed the importance of Carroll's pro-
nouncement that a warrant must be used where "reasonably prac-
ticable," a pronouncement which was ignored in deciding
Chambers. Justice Stewart wrote, "[B]y no possible stretch of the
legal imagination can this be made into a case where 'it is not
practicable to secure a warrant,' . . . and the 'automobile excep-
tion,' despite its label, is simply irrelevant. '5 7
The plurality's desire to return to Carroll was evident, as was
the Court's realization that Chambers had extended the automo-
bile exception far beyond its intended boundaries. Thus, Justice
Stewart admonished lower courts and law enforcement officials,
"The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears. '5 8
Unfortunately, Justice Stewart's admonishment was not fol-
lowed in subsequent cases, just as the Carroll pronouncement was
ignored in Chambers. Rather than returning to Carroll, as the
language of the plurality would suggest, the post-Coolidge deci-
sions continued the broadening process Chambers began.5 9 As a
result, Coolidge has been relegated to a holding limited to its spe-
cific facts, i.e., there must be truly exigent circumstances before
the warrantless search and seizure of a vehicle will be upheld if
the vehicle is located on private property."0
56 Id. at 461 n.18.
57 Id. at 462. Had it not been for the confusion Chambers bestowed on the
automobile exception, the Court probably never would have had the opportunity
to apply Carroll to the Coolidge facts. It is difficult to believe the State of New
Hampshire would have argued it was not practicable to obtain a warrant in this
situation when in fact a warrant, though subsequently invalidated, had been
obtained.
5 Id. at 461-62.
19 See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); United States ex rel. LaBelle v. LaVallee, 517 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1975).
60 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1974). For another case in
which the exigency requirement was strictly construed where a vehicle was
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After Coolidge, the automobile exception was in a state of
utter disarray, primarily because the lower courts were trying to
reconcile Chambers and Coolidge, a goal which was not easily
achieved."' It should be noted, however, that if the rule from Car-
roll which required the attainment of a warrant where "reasona-
bly practicable" had remained intact through Chambers
and Coolidge, no confusion would have surfaced. Both cases could
have easily been disposed of under such a test. Justice Stewart
obviously sought to revive the Carroll test in Coolidge, but the
Supreme Court's next pronouncement on the issue halted any
such revival.
In Cardwell v. Lewis,62 the defendant was being questioned
at police headquarters in regard to a murder. At the end of the
questioning, the defendant was arrested, whereupon the police
proceeded to seize, without a warrant, the defendant's automobile
from a nearby commercial parking lot. The vehicle was moved to
the police impoundment area where a warrantless search of the
exterior of the vehicle was conducted, revealing incriminating evi-
dence. 3 The defendant was convicted in state court, but upon a
writ of habeas corpus, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit held that the warrantless seizure and search were in
violation of the fourth amendment.6 '
Upon certiorari, four Justices 5 agreed with the Sixth Circuit,
while four other Justices66 concurred in the state court's holding.
The swingman, Justice Powell, voted to affirm the state court de-
cision, but his decision was based on his belief that the case was
not a proper one for habeas corpus relief. He did not address the
search and seizure issue.6 7
6' See, e.g., 'United States v. McClain, 531 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 835, wherein the court stated, "[W]e must attempt to reconcile the
irreconcilable. . . ." Id. at 433.
:2 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
63 Id. at 585-88.
6 Id. at 585.
"I Justices Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall found the warrantless
seizure violative of the fourth amendment. These Justices formed the plurality in
Coolidge which was clamoring for a return to Carroll.
" Justices Blackmun, White, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger found the
search and seizure to be within the purview of the fourth amendment.
11 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 596 (1974). Justice Powell said a state
prisoner's fourth amendment claims rarely bear on the question of innocence.
[Vol. 82
12
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 82, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 15
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol82/iss3/15
SEARCH WARRANT EXCEPTION
The Cardwell "plurality" became entrenched in American ju-
risprudence when it abandoned the troublesome "probable cause
plus exigent circumstances" standard in favor of a "probable
cause plus a lesser expectation of privacy" test.68 Justice Black-
mun wrote, "[I]nsofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends
to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone
of our inquiry. '69 In short, the Court held that a vehicle does not
have the necessary degree of privacy to invoke fourth amendment
protections because "its function is transportation and it seldom
serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. A
car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels pub-
lic thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain
view."'70 However, the above language does suggest that certain
areas in a vehicle, such as the glove compartment, the trunk, and
the area under the seats are protected by the fourth amendment
because they often serve as the "repository of personal effects"
and their contents are not in "plain view." But, subsequent auto-
mobile exception cases have not so interpreted Cardwell. 1 It
should also be noted that Cardwell did not eliminate the "exigent
circumstances" factor; rather, the Court created an either-or situ-
ation wherein lower courts could find warrantless searches lawful
(assuming probable cause) on the basis of either a lesser expecta-
tion of privacy or exigent circumstances.72
Therefore, on a writ of habeas corpus, the federal courts should only consider
whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise his fourth amend-
ment claims in state courts. This position was later adopted by a majority of the
Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
68 See, e.g., United States v. Newboum, 600 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1979);
Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d 1314 (lst Cir. 1975).
69 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591 (1974).
70 Id. at 590.
71 See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that a passenger in
a car does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment
or under the front seat); United States v. Carr, 584 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979) (upholding the warrantless seizure of rifles from the
locked trunk of defendant's car); United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.
1978) (upholding the warrantless seizure of evidence found under the carpet in
defendant's automobile).
72 For lower court cases decided under the probable cause plus exigent cir-
cumstances test, see, e.g., United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Moreno, 569 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 1615
(1978); United States v. Woods, 568 F.2d 509 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972
(1978); United States v. Peterson, 549 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v.
19801
13
Gardner: The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Awa
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The Cardwell "dissenters, '73 in an opinion by Justice Stew-
art, reiterated the adamant stance they took in Coolidge,74 i.e.,
that the original Carroll doctrine should be retained substantially
as Chief Justice Taft enunciated it in 1925:
[T]he Carroll doctrine simply recognizes the obvious-that a
moving automobile on the open road presents a situation
where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the ve-
hicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought .... Where there is no rea-
sonable likelihood that the automobile would or could be
moved, the Carroll doctrine is simply inapplicable71
Unfortunately, the majority of the lower courts followed the
Cardwell plurality opinion and continued ignoring the important
language from Carroll that stated a warrant must be obtained
Kelly, 547 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1977); and United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
For a case which upholds a warrantless vehicle search on the basis of a lesser
expectation of privacy, see United States v. McLaughlin, 578 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir.
1978).
For a case which uses a combination of the exigency test and the lesser expec-
tation of privacy test, see United States v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 855 (1978).
Not only did Justice Blackmun retain the exigency factor in Cardwell, but he
also refined its meaning.
Assuming that probable cause previously existed, we know of no case or
principle that suggests that the right to search on probable cause and
the reasonableness of seizing a car under exigent circumstances are fore-
closed if a warrant was not obtained at the first practicable mo-
ment.... The exigency may arise at any time, and the fact that the
police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possi-
bility of a current situation's necessitating prompt police action. Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595-96 (1974).
71 The term "dissent" is misleading in this case since the Court split four to
four on the issue of search and seizure. In fact, had Justice Powell not taken part
in the case, as opposed to writing his concurrence which established Justice Black-
mun's opinion as the plurality, the dissenters would have been the plurality. An
equal split of the Supreme Court results in affirmance of the highest-level lower
court which decided the case, thus, in this instance, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals would have been affirmed.
,74 The majority distinguished Cardwell from Coolidge on the ground
that Coolidge only applied to private property. Cardwell dealt with a car located
in a public parking garage. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 593 (1974).
75 Id. at 597-98.
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when "reasonably practicable." ' 6
In 1975 the Supreme Court was given yet another opportu-
nity to clarify its position regarding the automobile exception
when it decided Texas v. White.7 The defendant was arrested at
a drive-in bank within 10 minutes of the police receiving a
description of him from another bank where he had attempted to
cash checks on a non-existent fund. The defendant's car, rather
than being searched at the scene of the arrest, was taken to the
police station where a warrantless search was conducted.7 8 When
confronted with the issue of the warrantless search of the defen-
dant's car, the Supreme Court, rather than clarifying its prior po-
sition, proferred merely a per curiam opinion in which seven
members7" of the Court agreed that Chambers controlled and
that therefore the search was lawful.
After White, it appeared that for all practical purposes all
that was needed to validate a warrantless search or seizure of an
automobile was probable cause. Exigent circumstances were no
longer needed, because in their absence a court could justify a
search on the "lesser expectation of privacy" test,80 which effec-
tively renders the search dependent upon probable cause alone.
The one possible exception to this new standard was the Coolidge
situation wherein the vehicle is on private property, thereby in-
creasing its expectation of privacy, and there are no exigent cir-
7' See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 584 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 935 (1979); United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 953 (1978); United States v. Chuke, 554 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945
(1976); and Haefeli v. Chernoff, 526 F.2d 1314 (1st Cir. 1975).
For a case which relies on the Carroll impracticability requirement, see
United States v. Blanton, 520 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that the key
determination in deciding whether a warrant is needed is whether it is practicable
to secure a warrant).
7 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
78 Id. at 67-68.
79 Among the majority Justices in White was Justice Stewart, the writer of
the majority opinion in Coolidge and the dissenting opinion in Cardwell. He wrote
in Coolidge that Chambers merely extended the Carroll doctrine so that a war-
rantless search could be undertaken when it wasn't reasonable to conduct the
search on the highway. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 463 (1971).
Such a reading of Chambers ignores the "impracticable" requirement of Carroll.
The dissenters in White were Justices Marshall and Brennan.
80 See, e.g., Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
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cumstances upon which a warrantless search could be justified.
The broadening process which occurred through Chambers, Card-
well, and White rendered the automobile exception a misnomer.
The real exception was the case in which a warrant was required
prior to the search or seizure of the vehicle. 1
However, two recent Supreme Court cases can be read as an
attempt by the Court to reverse the broadening process that
Chambers began.8 2 In United States v. Chadwick,83 the respon-
dents removed a footlocker from a train and placed it in the
trunk of their automobile. Onlooking officers, who had probable
cause to believe marihuana was being transported in the footlock-
er, arrested the respondents and seized the car and the footlocker
while the trunk of the car was still open and before the car's en-
gine had been started. At the Federal building in Boston, an hour
and a half after the initial seizure, officers opened the double-
locked footlocker. They did not have a warrant to do so.s4 The
district court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the evi-
dence and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. On
certiorari to the Supreme Court, the government argued that the
footlocker was analogous to motor vehicles and that therefore the
same principles should apply.8 5 Chief Justice Burger, writing for a
seven-member majority, rejected this argument, holding that lug-
gage has a higher expectation of privacy than an automobile:
"Unlike an automobile, whose primary function is transportation,
luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. 8 6 There-
fore, luggage is afforded a higher degree of protection by the
81 The Supreme Court further approved warrantless vehicle searches in Cady
v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), and South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976). In both cases, the Supreme Court approved the routine inventorying of the
contents of lawfully impounded vehicles, including locked compartments.
A further expansion of warrantless vehicle searches has recently occurred in
the lower courts where the "stop and frisk" rationale of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), has been expanded to vehicles. See, e.g., United States v. Rainone, 586
F.2d 1132 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1787 (1979); and United States v.
Green, 465 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1972), where the "frisk" of automobiles has been
approved during the course of a Terry stop.
81 See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), and Arkansas v. Sand-
ers, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979).
433 U.S. 1 (1977).
8 Id. at 3-5.
" Id. at 11-12.
88 Id. at 13.
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fourth amendment than an automobile. The Court further noted
that the warrantless search could not be justified by the mobility
factor, as "there was not the slightest danger that the footlocker
or its contents could have been removed before a valid search
warrant could be obtained. '1 7 Such reasoning would appear to ap-
ply with equal force to such cases as Chambers and White in
which the searched vehicles were in the sole control of the police.
However, the Court said in a footnote that absolutely secure stor-
age facilities may not be available to store an automobile until a
warrant can be obtained, thus, the automobile is subject to a war-
rantless search while the luggage found in the automobile is not.88
Such weak, unsubstantiated reasoning for such an important dis-
tinction seems like a written invitation by the Court to the na-
tion's defense lawyers, asking them to challenge the Court's prior
position as to automobile searches.
Chief Justice Burger presented defense lawyers with futher
ammunition to gun down past automobile exception holdings
when he wrote: "With the footlocker safely immobilized, it was
unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of
a search without a warrant."89 In Chambers, the Court had ex-
pressly held that the search of a vehicle was no greater an intru-
sion than the seizure of the vehicle.90 The Court explained its
seemingly contrary Chadwick rule, again in a footnote, by stating
that the defendant had a privacy interest in the contents of the
footlocker, but no privacy interest in the footlocker as a whole,
which was exposed to public view in the same manner as an auto-
mobile. Therefore, the search was a greater intrusion than the
seizure.9 1 The Court failed to explain how a search of a vehicle's
trunk or glove compartment is different than a search of the in-
side of a footlocker. Indeed, it appears to be an indistinguishable
difference and again, one which defense lawyers should seize
upon.
Further evidence of Chadwick's limiting nature in regard to
the automobile exception is the following statement from Chief
Justice Burger:
87 Id.
" Id. at 13 n.7.
s' Id. at 13.
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
91 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-14 n.8 (1977).
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Even though on this record the issuance of a warrant by a ju-
dicial officer was reasonably predictable, a line must be drawn.
In our view, when no exigency is shown to support the need for
an immediate search, the Warrant Clause places the line at the
point where the property to be searched comes under the ex-
clusive dominion of police authority.92
Arguably, once the occupants of a vehicle are arrested, the police
have exclusive dominion over the vehicle, and therefore, a war-
rant must be obtained prior to any search of the vehicle.
While Chadwick certainly went a long way toward limiting
the automobile exception, there remained much room for further
limitation before the present automobile exception would be re-
turned to its original Carroll form. In 1979, Arkansas v. Sanders"5
began that further limitation . 4 In Sanders, police officers re-
ceived a tip from a reliable informant alerting them to the fact
the defendant would be arriving at the Little Rock airport that
afternoon, carrying a green suitcase full of marihuana. As pre-
91 Id. at 15.
93 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979).
" In 1978, prior to Arkansas v. Sanders, the Supreme Court decided Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), wherein the fourth amendment protections available
to automobile passengers were severely limited.
The defendants were stopped by an officer who recognized the vehicle the
defendants were driving as one used in a robbery. The defendants were removed
from the car, at which time a warrantless search of the vehicle revealed a box of
rifle shells inside the glove compartment, which was locked, and a sawed-off rifle
under the front passenger seat. The defendants did not own the car, nor did they
assert a possessory interest in the items seized. The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari to determine whether the defendants had standing to challenge the warrant-
less search and seizure as a violation of their fourth amendment rights. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a five-member majority, held that since petitioners asserted
neither a property nor a possessory interest in the vehicle or the items seized, and
since they failed to establish that they had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the interior of the vehicle, they did not have standing to challenge the warrantless
search and seizure.
While the decision is adverse to passengers in vehicles which are subjected to
warrantless searches, the case can be beneficial to a defense lawyer who represents
either the owner of the vehicle or one who asserts a possessory interest in the
items seized. Justice Rehnquist repeatedly referred to the non-possessory interest
of the defendants, thereby giving rise to the inference that an owner or one who
has a possessory interest has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove com-
partment or under the seat, and therefore, a warrantless search of those areas,
absent exigent circumstances, cannot be undertaken.
[Vol. 82
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dicted, the defendant was at the airport and officers observed him
place the suitcase in the trunk of a taxi, in which he then left.
The cab was stopped a few blocks from the airport and the driver
consented to a search of the vehicle's trunk. Officers removed the
suitcase and conducted an immediate warrantless search of its
contents, thereby finding the marihuana.9 5
The trial court upheld the warrantless search, but the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court reversed, apparently on the basis of the origi-
nal Carroll rationale:
[T]here is nothing in this set of circumstances that would lend
credence to an assertion of impracticality in obtaining a search
warrant.... With the suitcase safely immobilized, it was un-
reasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrusion of
a search without a warrant.9
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, thereby extending
Chadwick, which involved luggage seized from a stationary vehi-
cle, to luggage seized from a moving vehicle. Underlying the
Court's decisions in Chadwick and Sanders is the idea that ob- (
jects taken from a vehicle, like luggage, are subject to a higher
expectation of privacy than the vehicle itself. Thus, Chambers
and Cardwell allow a warrantless search of the vehicle, but Chad-
wick and Sanders disallow a warrantless search of the objects
found in the vehicle. The Court in Sanders, just as it had in
Chadwick, declined to explain the difference between a locked
trunk and a locked piece of luggage.
As to the Government's contention that the mobility of the
luggage created an exigent circumstance which justified the war-
rantless search, Justice Powell, the majority writer, explained:
A closed suitcase in the trunk of an automobile may be as mo-
bile as the vehicle in which it rides. But as we noted in Chad-
wick, the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point
immediately before the search-after the police have seized
the object to be searched and have it securely within their
control.17
Such language seemingly would preclude warrantless automobile
" 99 S. Ct. at 2588.
" Sanders v. State, 262 Ark. 595, 600-01, 559 S.W.2d 704, 706-07 (1977).
97 99 S. Ct. at 2593.
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searches where the vehicle is in the sole control of the police.
However, the Court disagreed, as it did in Chadwick, contending
that seizure and control of a vehicle is too great a burden to im-
pose upon police departments.98 Again, such reasoning is certainly
open to attack. It appears the Court has given too much weight to
the convenience of the police and not enough weight to the fourth
amendment rights of individuals who travel in vehicles.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
It is not surprising that the lower courts' decisions in regard
to the automobile exception have been inconsistent in post-
Chambers cases.99 However, one would think the relatively clear,
easy to apply Carroll doctrine would have been applied uniformly
before Chambers. But, such was not the case in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, where Carroll was used to support whatever proposition the
prosecution needed it to support. For example, in two 1931 cases,
Fisher v. United States00 and Bess v. United States,10 1 the
o Fourth Circuit dealt with Carroll only on the grounds of probable
cause and the vehicle's mobility, thereby skirting the "reasonably
practicable" requirement.
In Fisher, officers had advance information, including the li-
cense number, that a certain vehicle was being used in the unlaw-
ful transportation of whiskey. The officers went on patrol looking
specifically for the vehicle and upon locating it, the defendant
was arrested and the vehicle was searched.102 The Fourth Circuit
justified the warrantless intrusion by relying on Carroll.10 How-
ever, the court did not address the Carroll pronouncement that a
warrant must be used when reasonably practicable. If it had, the
evidence against the defendant would have been excluded, since
it would certainly have been practicable for the officers to procure
a search warrant for the vehicle before they ever went on patrol
98 Id. at 2594 n.14.
Compare United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974), with
United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1979).
100 46 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1931).
101 49 F.2d 884 (4th Cir. 1931).
102 46 F.2d at 994-95.
103 Id. at 995. In Carroll, the officers were not specifically looking for the de-
fendant's vehicle. Fisi~r involved a planned warrantless search, which Carroll cer-
tainly did not condone.
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in search of the vehicle.
A similar fact situation ended in a similar result in Bess,
where again the officers had advance information concerning a
certain vehicle which would be used in an illegal liquor deliv-
ery.104 Just as in Fisher, although the officers did not secure a
warrant prior to searching the vehicle, the planned warrantless
search was upheld by the Fourth Circuit under the supposed au-
thority of Carroll.10 5 Again, the practicability issue was not ad-
dressed in a situation, Where if it had, the defendant would not
have been convicted.
The Fourth Circuit seemed to rediscover the "impracticabil-
ity" requirement of Carroll in 1952 in Godette v. United
States.105 Agents, after destroying an illegal still, saw the defen-
dant driving a truck containing 120 one-hundred pound bags of
sugar toward the location of the still. The agents knew the defen-
dant as one having a reputation for dealing in illegal whiskey, and
therefore they seized the truck and its contents.10 7 The Fourth
Circuit again upheld the warrantless seizure under the authority
of Carroll. However, the court cited, for the first time, the "im-
practicability" requirement of Carroll.'20 Thus, in Fisher and
Bess, where it was not impracticable to obtain a warrant, the
court ignored Carroll's requirement of impracticability. But when
a case such as Godette surfaced, where the obtaining of a warrant
was truly impracticable, the court focused on the "forgotten"
Carroll rule. This method of analysis allowed the court to justify
warrantless searches of vehicles on the grounds of probable cause
and vehicular mobility, which are only two-thirds of the Carroll
test.
The impracticability requirement was again adhered to in
Harmon v. United States09 where officers were presented with a
situation similar to the Godette facts.110 In upholding the war-
'10 Bess v. United States, 49 F.2d 884, 884-85 (4th Cir. 1931).
105 Id. at 885. For two different views concerning planned warrantless
searches, compare, Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1968), with
United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976).
10 199 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1952).
117 Id. at 332.
103 Id.
109 210 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1954).
1"0 In Harmon, police surrounded an area in which they believed illegal liquor
1980]
21
Gardner: The Automobile Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Speeding Awa
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1980
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
rantless search and seizure of a truck carrying moonshine, the
Fourth Circuit held: "When the officers of the law have probable
cause for believing that the law is being violated in their presence
and it is impracticable to obtain a search warrant they may pro-
ceed with the search without it.""' Such a clear pronouncement
of the law would seem to entrench in the Fourth Circuit the im-
practicability requirement as originally dictated by Carroll. How-
ever, just four years later, in Ray v. United States,"2 the court
failed to adhere to the Harmon holding. In Ray, the defendant, a
known illegal liquor trafficker, was seen parked at a known source
of contraband liquor. Thereafter, agents staked out her motel and
when she arrived, a warrantless search of her vehicle was con-
ducted. 13 The Fourth Circuit upheld the warrantless search, say-
ing merely: "There is no longer any doubt that a search warrant is
not a prerequisite to a legal search of an automobile being oper-
ated upon the highways."' The issue of practicability was not
addressed, despite the clear pronouncement of Harmon.
Although Harmon was not ignored in the Fourth Circuit's
next decision on the issue, it was in fact not followed. In United
States v. Haith,"5 the defendant contended that once he was ar-
rested and the officers had sole control over his vehicle, it was not
practicable to conduct a search of the vehicle without first ob-
taining a warrant."16 The Fourth Circuit disagreed:
In all of the automobile cases, once the officers have seized the
vehicle and obtained exclusive possession of it, it becomes
practical, in a sense, to postpone the search until a warrant has
been obtained. Probable cause being present, however, the
cases unanimously sustain the legality of an undelayed search,
was being transported. At 4:00 a.m. a truck was seen leaving the area. Upon seeing
the police, the truck driver abandoned the vehicle. Thereupon the police searched
the truck and located the illegal whiskey. Id. at 59.
112 Id.
112 255 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1958).
11 Id. at 474.
11 Id. at 475. Compare Ray with Niro v. United States, 388 F.2d 535 (1st Cir.
1968) (holding a search violative of the fourth amendment where officers had time
to procure a warrant prior to the search).
115 297 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 804 (1962).
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and none suggests the distinction the defendant urges.' 17
When considering the Fourth Circuit's pre-Chambers automobile
search cases it is apparent that the exception is premised on
probable cause and vehicular mobility. Only in those cases where
it was truly impracticable to obtain a warrant prior to the search,
was impracticality of obtaining a warrant considered a factor.
Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Chambers in 1970, the -Fourth Circuit has decided two major au-
tomobile exception cases. First, in 1974, the court attempted to
reconcile Carroll, Chambers, and Coolidge in United States v.
Bradshaw."" In Bradshaw, agents went to the residence of the
defendant, a known moonshiner, in order to locate a still. After
an unsuccessful search for the still, the agents were preparing to
leave when they saw the defendant drive up and enter his home.
The agents knocked on the front door and when the defendant
did not answer, they began to walk around the house to check the
back door. While walking by a truck parked next to the house,
the agents could smell the strong odor of moonshine whiskey. The
agents, without a warrant, entered the truck and seized a large
quantity of moonshine whiskey. ' In a decision which elevated
the warrant requirement in the Fourth Circuit to a height far
greater than that of the Supreme Court or any other circuit, the
Fourth Circuit held the search violative of the fourth amendment.
The court stated that the only reason the agents had for not ob-
taining a search warrant was that the vehicle would have to be
guarded while an officer went after a warrant, otherwise there was
a risk that evidence would be lost.1 '0 In direct conflict with the
117 Id.
It8 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974).
Other Fourth Circuit cases dealing with the automobile exception include the
following: United States v. Powers, 439 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1971) (holding that
there is not a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning the identification of
the vehicle, although in certain situations the search for identification numbers
may become unreasonable); United States v. Gomori, 437 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1971)
(holding that an officer possessing information sufficient to constitute probable
cause to search may stop and search a moving vehicle without being required to
obtain a search warrant). See also United States v. Stanley, 597 F.2d 866 (4th Cir.
1979); United States v. Colclough, 549 F.2d 937 (4th Cir. 1977); Hilleary v. Wal-
lace, 519 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1975); and Meade v. Cox, 438 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1971).
119 United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (4th Cir. 1974).
120 Id. at 1103.
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Ninth Circuit decision in United States v. Connolly, 2' the
Fourth Circuit held that the inconvenience of posting a guard was
not a sufficiently exigent circumstance to permit the suspension
of the fourth amnendment.
According to the Fourth Circuit, the automobile exception af-
ter Carroll, Chambers, and Coolidge was applicable only in the
"presence of circumstances indicating the risk of loss of evi-
dence.' 1 22 The holding is basically a reversion to the original Car-
roll pronouncement that where a warrant may be reasonably se-
cured, it must be used. While the court should be commended for
recognizing the "third criteria" of the Carroll holding, no such
applause is in order for its application of the rule to these facts.
The facts of Bradshaw indicate that the defendant was still in the
house when the agents searched the truck. Such a situation cer-
tainly makes the attainment of a search warrant impracticable
since the defendant could have been armed, thereby putting the
lives of the guards in jeopardy. Had the defendant already been
arrested, the Bradshaw holding would have been far more reason-
able. Regardless of whether Bradshaw was a correct application
of Carroll, it cannot be controverted that Bradshaw required a
stricter adherence to the fourth amendment than any case de-
cided in the federal courts after Chambers.12'
Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit has recently abandoned its
strict adherence to the fourth amendment. In 1979, in apparent
response to the Supreme Court's carte blanche attitude toward
vehicle searches,' 2 4 the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion evincing
views similar to those enunciated by the Supreme Court. United
States v. Newbourn'25 is a classic example of a planned warrant-
less search which was subsequently approved by the court. In
Newbourn, a reliable informant relayed information to the police
concerning the upcoming sale of stolen firearms by the defend-
ants to the informant. Based upon the informant's information,
121 479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1973).
122 United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1103 (4th Cir. 1974).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Abascal, 564 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1977); United
States v. Chuke, 554 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Moody, 485 F.2d
531 (3rd Cir. 1973); and United States v. Carneglia, 468 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1972).
124 See, e.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583 (1974).
125 600 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1979).
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police watched as the defendants drove down a road in a truck,
followed by the informant in another vehicle. The vehicles even-
tually stopped along the side of the road and the parties began
negotiating the sale of the firearms. During the course of the ne-
gotiations, the police arrived, arrested the defendants, and then
took the keys to the defendants' vehicle. The officers then opened
the locked trunk of the vehicle and discovered the stolen fire-
arms.128 The officers did not have a search warrant.
The district court, in obvious reliance upon Bradshaw, con-
cluded that it would have been practical for the officers to have
obtained a search warrant, and since they failed to do so, the
search was unlawful. 127 The district court stated that the defend-
ants were arrested prior to the search, thus, there was no danger
in delaying the search until a warrant could be obtained. 28
The Fourth Circuit, with Chief Judge Haynsworth129 writing
the decision, agreed that the officers could have procured a war-
rant.130 However, the court disagreed as to whether such a factor
removed the case from the automobile exception.131 The court ini-
tially established what it considered the automobile exception not
to be:
The mobility of automobiles was recognized as a crucial fac-
tor .... More recently, it has been recognized that the auto-
mobile exception rests upon other considerations than mobility
of the vehicle and the possibility that it and its contents may
be concealed or removed from the jurisdiction. 3 2 (emphasis
supplied).
The court then pointed to the lesser expectation of privacy in ve-
hicles as the current key factor to a determination of whether a
128 Id. at 453.
127 Id.
128 Id. But see United States v. Haith, 297 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1961), wherein
the court rejected the defendant's argument that a warrant should have been ob-
tained while other officers guarded the vehicle.
20 Newbourn was heard in the Fourth Circuit before a panel consisting of
Chief Judge Haynsworth, Circuit Judge Butzner and Circuit Judge Phillips.
13 United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452, 453 (4th Cir. 1979).
1"' "We agree the officers could have gotten a warrant after defendants were
arrested. That fact doesn't remove the case from the automobile exception." Id.
132 Id. at 454.
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warrantless search is justified.1 33
Chief Judge Haynsworth relied heavily upon Cady v. Dom-
browski13' in upholding the search in Newbourn. In Cady, an off-
duty police officer was involved in a car wreck. After the car had
been towed to a storage lot, a policeman remembered that there
was probably a gun in the car, so he went to retrieve it. When he
opened the trunk, without a warrant, he found blood stains which
eventually led to the conviction of the injured officer for mur-
der.36 The Fourth Circuit, relying primarily on the fact that both
searches were undertaken for the purpose of locating guns, said
the Newbourn search should be upheld just as the Cady search
had been upheld.136 The court concluded that a warrantless
search should be upheld "if the objective facts present a reasona-
ble basis for a belief that there is a potential danger similar to or
greater than that presented in Cady, which danger should be
inactivated."1 37
Does this mean the search in Newbourn would have been in-
valid if it had been for anything except firearms? Apparently not.
The court, after its discussion of Cady, stated that the search was
also valid under the authority of Chambers. "If a warrantless
search of the vehicle after its impoundment and removal to the
police station was authorized, so was a warrantless search on the
roadside. . . .18 This view is premised on the Chambers theory
that the search is not a greater intrusion into an individual's pri-
vacy than the mere seizure. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit
chose not to adopt the more sensible position taken by Justice
Harlan in his Chambers dissent, wherein he stated a search is
more intrusive than a mere seizure.139
13 "There is a diminished privacy interest of a motorist operating a vehicle
on our public streets and highways." Id. at 454, citing South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1975).
'" 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
Id. at 435-38.
United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 1979).
137 Id. at 456.
"3 Id. Chambers stated that if an immediate roadside search would be valid,
so would a subsequent search at the police station. The Fourth Circuit in
Newbourn has re-worded this holding, stating that a roadside search is valid if the
vehicle could have been impounded and lawfully searched at the station.
M' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 63-64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
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As for Bradshaw, Newbourn did not expressly overrule it.
However, Bradshaw was relegated to a holding applying only to
warrantless searches of vehicles located on private property, just
as Coolidge was limited by Cardwell.
140
Thus, Newbourn places the Fourth Circuit in compliance
with the Supreme Court, i.e., a warrantless search of a vehicle is
lawful in nearly all cases where probable cause is present, the one
exception being when the search is conducted on private
property.
IV. WEST VIRGINIA
Consider the following situation: A reliable informant tells
the police the defendant will be in the parking lot of a local res-
taurant at 11:00 on a designated morning to complete a drug sale
to the informant. The informant describes the defendant, the ve-
hicle he will be driving, and the type and quantity of drugs he
will be carrying. On the designated morning, the defendant drives
into the parking lot as predicted by the informant. He is immedi-
ately surrounded by police who take his car keys, unlock the
trunk and glove compartment, and confiscate the drugs contained
therein. The officers do not have a search warrant.
If this case came before the United States Supreme Court or
any of the federal circuit courts, including the Fourth Circuit, the
warrantless search would probably be upheld on the basis of
Cardwell's "lesser expectation of privacy" test or under Cham-
bers' "probable cause plus exigent circumstances" test.14 '
As previously discussed, a vehicle receives very little protec-
tion in the federal courts from warrantless intrusions. However,
the individual state courts are only obligated to meet the mini-
mum constitutional standards set by the Supreme Court. Thus,
West Virginia is free to afford greater fourth amendment protec-
tions to defendants by deciding its cases under Article 3, Section
6 of the West Virginia Constitution,'14 2 as opposed to the fourth
40 United States v. Newbourn, 600 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1979).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 538 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977) (holding that the fact there was ample time after
probable cause had arisen for the obtaining of a warrant does not invalidate a
search where an exigency exists at the time of the seizure of the vehicle).
142 W. VA. CONST., art. 3, § 6, provides:
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amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
As a result, when the above fact situation came before the
Circuit Court of Logan County,143 West Virginia, the drugs were
properly suppressed upon motion by the defense counsel. The
court reasoned that the officers had ample opportunity to procure
a search warrant prior to the search, and that failure to do so
rendered the search violative of the general warrant require-
ment.144 Whether this reliance on the original Carroll doctrine
would be affirmed by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals is left to mere speculation, since the West Virginia court has
never directly addressed the automobile exception issue.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has, however,
recognized the existence of the automobile exception. In State v.
Angel, 45 the court stated there are certain narrow instances in
which a suspect may be searched without a warrant, such as "an
automobile in motion. . . . "'4 West Virginia's decisions in regard
to warrantless searches generally indicate the Supreme Court of
Appeals is very protective of an individual's fourth amendment
rights.147 There is no reason to believe this attitude would not
carry over to vehicles when an automobile exception case appears
before the court. Illustrative of this point is State v. Frisby.14e In
Frisby, while discussing unwarranted intrusions during routine
police stops of vehicles, Justice Neely wrote:
[R]egardless of length of hair, color of skin, political convic-
The rights of the citizens to be secure in their houses, persons, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated. No warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, or
the person or thing to be seized.
143 See State v. Koegel, Felony Nos. 79-F-125, 79-F-126, 79-F-127 (Logan Co.
Cir. Ct., W. Va. Aug. 17, 1979).
144 See Record, at 10-11, State v. Koegel, Felony Nos. 79-F-125, 79-F-126, 79-
F-127 (Logan Co. Cir. Ct., W. Va. Aug. 17, 1979).
145 154 W. Va. 615, 177 S.E.2d 562 (1970).
.46 Id. at 628, 177 S.E.2d at 570.
141 See, e.g., State v. NcNeal, 251 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va. 1979) (wherein the Su-
preme Court of Appeals narrowly construed exigent circumstances in regard to
warrantless arrests); and State v. Duvernoy, 156 W. Va. 578, 195 S.E.2d 631 (1973)
(holding that a Terry stop and frisk does not apply to crimes which are tradition-
ally non-violent in nature).
148 245 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1978).
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tions, eccentricity of life-style, or any of the other standard
grounds which inspire people to make the lives of others mis-
erable, a person in West Virginia is free to go about his busi-
ness at all hours of the day and night unencumbered by the
need to relate his life's story to every passing, underemployed
agent of the State." 9
And in State v. Canby,150 Justice Neely, while addressing the
analogous issue of warrantless arrests, stated, "The rarity of justi-
fiable warrantless arrests is increased by the requirement under
the new magistrate court system that a magistrate be available
twenty-four hours a day."'15
The most illuminating example of West Virginia's protective
attitude is State v. Tomey,152 wherein Arkansas v. Sanders'53 was
taken one step further. In Tomey, the defendant was arrested af-
ter putting a suitcase in the back seat of his car, but before the
car was started. The arresting officer then conducted a warrant-
less search of the suitcase, finding twelve packages of mari-
huana. 5' The Supreme Court of Appeals ordered the marihuana
suppressed, thereby stretching Sanders from covering suitcases
seized from trunks to suitcases taken from plain view in the back
seat of a vehicle. 55 In an opinion written by Justice Neely, the
court noted that the prosecution attempted to justify the war-
rantless search on the basis of Chambers. Justice Neely rejected
the argument, stating that Chambers is inapplicable because it
was not intended to apply to "closed containers."'' 5 This leaves
one very important question open in West Virginia: is a trunk or
a glove compartment a "closed container" for the purposes of the
warrant requirement? The United States Supreme Court would
obviously say "no." The distinguishing factor between a locked
trunk and a locked piece of luggage, according to Chadwick, is the
degree of dominion and control the officers can exert over the ar-
ticle in question. In Chadwick, the Court stated that a vehicle,
119 Id. at 625.
150 252 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1979).
151 Id. at 167.
152 259 S.E.2d 16 (W. Va. 1979).
:53 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979).
54 State v. Tomey, 259 S.E.2d 16, 17 (W. Va. 1979).
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including its trunk, is subject to an immediate warrantless search,
whereas luggage, which can easily be secured safely in a building,
cannot be searched until a warrant is obtained.157 Whether West
Virginia will follow the above Chadwick rationale remains to be
seen. Certainly, a counter-argument can be made. It is difficult to
fathom a police department so small or so under-staffed that it
cannot safely secure a vehicle for the short period of time it takes
to procure a search warrant. Thus, once officers have exclusive
control of a vehicle, i.e., the occupants are arrested, it is not un-
reasonable to expect the Supreme Court of Appeals to require
that a search warrant be obtained prior to the search of the vehi-
cle. Such a holding would be consistent not only with Carroll,158
but also with Cardwell since people do have an expectation of
privacy in their trunks and glove compartments. 59
V. CONCLUSION
The original Carroll doctrine was very simple, clear, and
most importantly, easy to apply. It condoned warrantless searches
of vehicles only where the vehicle was actually mobile, it was im-
practicable to obtain a search warrant, and the officers were act-
ing upon probable cause. Following the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Chambers, Cardwell, and White, all that re-
mains of Carroll is the probable cause requirement. As a result,
law enforcement officials continue conducting warrantless
searches of vehicles, leading to suppression motions by defend-
ants which often end in an appellate review. The Carroll "imprac-
ticability" requirement would go a long way toward dissolving the
above cycle. If law enforcement officials were informed that Car-
roll was the law, they would not conduct a warrantless search ex-
cept in the most exigent of circumstances. This would lead to
fewer suppression hearings and fewer appellate cases, while at the
same time maintaining the fourth amendment rights of the
defendant.
The Supreme Court's decisions, beginning with Chambers in
'" See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 n.7 (1976).
"88 In Carroll, the vehicle's occupants were not arrested prior to the warrant-
less search.
159 It is not at all uncommon for a person to keep valuables in his trunk or
glove compartment, where he presumes they will be free from public inspection.
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1970, have greatly increased search and seizure litigation because
of the confusion the cases have created. A clear pronouncement of
a reversion back to the original Carroll doctrine is much needed.
In the meantime, West Virginia could adopt the Carroll doctrine,
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